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#### Movements against neoliberalism are growing in Latin America and spill over -- the plans reifies neoliberalism --- ethics require we de-link to preserve the environment and indigenous culture.

Harris 8 (Richard L Harris: Professor of Global Studies at California State University, Monterey Bay; Managing Editor of the Journal of Developing Societies (SAGE India); and Coordi­ nating Editor of Latin American Perspectives (SAGE USA). “Latin America’s Response to Neoliberalism and Globalization,” http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/3506\_2.pdf)

The economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is obstructed by the power relations and international structures that regulate the world capitalist system. The structures of this system provide a hierarchical political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, balanced and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the governments of the core as well as the peripheral countries in this system to pursue a path of inward-oriented, equitable, democratically controlled and environmentally sustainable development (Amin 2001b:20). Since the 1980s, inter-American relations and the economic, political and social development of the Latin American and Caribbean states have been shaped by these geo­ political structures and the neoliberal strategic agenda put forward by the government of the United States of America (USA), the major transnational corporations and the three major international financial institutions (IFIs) that operate in the Latin American and Caribbean region (Harris and Nef, 2008). This later group of IFIs includes the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). The policies of these IFIs based in Washington generally follow the dictates of the government of the USA due to the controlling influence that it exercises over these institutions. Their agenda for the Latin American and Caribbean region gives priority to promoting and protecting the interests of the major investors and transnational corporations that are largely based in the USA and operate in the region. It also serves to maintain and strengthen the geopolitical hegemony of the USA over the Western Hemisphere (Harris and Nef). But conditions are changing. Washington’s neoliberal agenda for controlling the capi­ talist development of the Western Hemisphere and maintaining US hegemony over the region is increasingly threatened by a progressive alternative agenda for the regio­ nal integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries that has begun to gain widespread support in the region. This alternative agenda for the region calls for the autonomous economic development of the region free of the hegemonic control and influence of the USA and the IFIs based in Washington. Not only does this type of development pose a fundamental threat to the hegemony of the USA in the region, it threatens the dominance of transnational capital throughout the Americas. Moreover, it also poses a significant threat to the global expansion and integration of the world capitalist system in general and to the global hegemonic coalition led by the government and transnational corporations of the USA. Today, political and economic strategies are being developed for moving from the prevailing export-oriented neoliberal model of economic development to new in­ ward-oriented models of sustainable development, tailored to the diverse conditions, economic capacities, political structures, natural endowments and cultural values of the societies involved. Moreover, a growing number of international and regional civil society organizations have emerged in recent years to create such alternatives. What the forums, networks, programs, and activities of these various types of organizations reveal is that there is a growing international network of organizations and social movements committed to promoting new, more equitable forms of international cooperation and regulation that support inward-oriented and sustainable development as well as genuine democracy at the regional and national levels. At the same time, these organizations argue that the present global trading regime that has been erected under the WTO should and can be replaced by a new global trading system that replaces the present system of so-called free but in fact unfair trade, with a sys­ tem that ensures «fair trade» and promotes South-South economic exchange and coo­ peration. Most of the progressive alternatives advocated by these organizations and the new left-leaning governments that have been elected to office in the region give priority to aligning the external relations of the countries in the region to the internal needs of the majority of the population. That is to say, decisions about what to export and what to import should be aligned with the needs of the population rather than the interests of transnational capitalists and transnational corporations or the hegemonic interests of the USA. Some of these alternative strategies involve what Walden Bello (2002) has referred to as «deglobalization.» That is to say, they involve unlinking the economies of these peripheral capitalist societies from the advanced capitalist centers of the world economy, particularly in the USA. They also involve throwing off the constraints that have been imposed upon the economic policies and structures of the­ se countries by the IFIs (IMF, World Bank, and IDB), the WTO and the other agents and regulatory regimes that regulate the world capitalist system. In fact, there appears to be growing interest throughout Latin America in revivifying the Pan-American ideal of unification, currently perhaps best expressed in Hugo Chávez’ Bolivarian dream of turning South America into a regional economic hegemon (DeLong, 2005). The governments of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay have indicated they want to join the government of Venezuela in creating a regional union. It has been proposed that this coalescing continental confederation should shift the region’s extra-continental trade towards Europe, Asia and South Africa and away from North America. The prospect of this happening appears to have alarmed Washington more than the increasing number of electoral triumphs of leftist politicians in the region (Delong). There has also been considerable talk in the region about creating a single currency for the South American countries that would be modeled on and perhaps tied to the Euro rather than the US Dollar. This discussion is symptomatic of what appears to be an emerging desire to create an integrated economic and political community that is strikingly different from the type of hemispheric economic integration scheme being pursued by the Washington and its allies in the region (DeLong). Moreover, there is an increasing tendency in the region to find alternatives to trading with the USA. In particular, several Latin American nations (Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela and Chile) have been strengthening their economic relations with Asia, particularly with China. But the widespread popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization, and the shift to the Left in the region’s politics, represent much more than a serious challenge to US hegemony, they also represent a serious threat to the existing pattern of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the region which involves the increasing integration of the region’s economies into a hemispheric ‘free trade’ area or rather a trade bloc that is dominated by the USA. This project is itself an essential part of the strategy of the USA for the domination of the global economy by its transnational corporations. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization has been aimed at giving the USA-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the world economy In opposition to the neoliberal, polyarchical and globalizing model of development that has been imposed by the government of the USA and its allies in the region, the growing movement for an alternative form of development that is both genuinely democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative model of development requires the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region. It also requires the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of social forces that are behind the integration of the region into the new global circuits of accumulation and production that the major trans­ national corporations and the IFIs have been constructing since the 1970s. In addition to fundamental economic changes, most of the existing pseudo-democratic political regimes in the region need to be thoroughly democratized so that they are responsive to and capable of serving the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling polyarchies and the transnational corporations operating in the region. An essential requirement for realigning the region’s economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is the integration of these economies into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, structures and the power to operate independently of the government of the USA and the transnational corporations based in the USA as well as in the European Union and Japan. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the USA, and reverse the denationalization (‘globalization’) of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under the hegemony of the USA, a new system of regional economic cooperation and both equitable as well as environmentally sustainable development is desperately needed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regional, equitable and sustainable development can only be success­ fully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. It probably will also require democratic socialist political institutions and structures of production and distribution. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifying Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African socialists such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who saw regional integration as the only means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united and democratic Africa (Faux, 2001:4). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-cen­ tered, democratic, equitable and environmentally sustainable social order in the Ame­ ricas, the corporate-dominated process of capitalist pseudo-globalization taking place in the region and around the world urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Amin has referred to as a new system of «pluricentric regulated globalization» (Amin, 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political unions in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic and envi­ ronmentally sustainable forms of development on a regional basis. According to Amin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collecti­ vely regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the northern centers of the world capitalist system in the USA, Europe and Japan. This type of regional-based regulative order is needed to regulate and redirect inter­ national economic, social, and political relations so that these relations serve the inte­ rests and needs of the vast majority of the world’s population. The present power structures and regulatory regime of the world capitalist system support the transna­ tional corporate-driven restructuring and denationalization of the economies of both the societies at the core and in the periphery of this system. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to ‘de-link’ step-by-step from this exploitative and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their eco­ nomies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protec­ ting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic, poli­ tical and social development proposed and in some cases adopted by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, combined with the project of regional integration associated with the new Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), are significant indications of unprecedented and pro­ found transformation unfolding in the Americas. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the pro­ gressive civil society networks such as the Alianza Social Continental/ Hemispheric Social Alliance (ASC/HSA) describes as a regional model of integration that supports the environmentally sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA, 2006). The ASC/HSA also contends that the UNASUR pro­ ject and the Bolivarian dream of unification is threatened by the so-called free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic. As the ASC/HSA makes clear in its documents and public information campaigns, these agreements compromise the national sovereignty, obstruct the local production of medicines, threaten public health, facilitate the profit-driven privatization of water and vital services such as health and sanitation, and threaten the survival of indigenous cultures, biodiversity, food sovereignty, and local control over natural resources. The «Alternatives for the Americas» proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive civil society organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to subordinate trade and investments to sustainability and environmental protection as well as social justice and local democratic control over economic and social development (ASC/HSA 2002:5). The growing number and political influence of these kinds of networks, organizations and movements provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social for­ ces and political conditions that Panitch (1996:89) and others (Harris, 1995:301-302; Jo­ nas and McCaughan, 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoli­ beralism, corporate-dominated pseudo globalization and the extension and consolida­ tion of the hegemony of the USA. It now seems increasingly possible that these forces and the political mobilization that they have helped to create will transform the politi­ cal regimes in the region as well as the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of the Latin American countries and free these countries from US hegemony and the form of ‘turbo-capitalism’ to which they have been subjected. At this point, we can only speak in general terms about the new model(s) of develop­ ment that will replace the neoliberal model of uneven and inequitable development that has pillaged most of the region.

#### Environment collapse causes extinction – tipping points are coming

**Foster et al., Oregon sociology professor, 2010**

(John, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth, pg 14-8, ldg)

It is common today to see this ecological rift simply in terms of climate change, which given the dangers it poses and the intractable problems for capitalism it presents has grabbed all the headlines. But recently scientists—in a project led by Johan Rockstrom at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, and including Crutzen and the leading U.S. climatologist, James Hansen—have developed an analysis of nine "planetary boundaries" that are crucial to maintaining an earth-system environment in which humanity can exist safely. Climate change is only one of these, and the others are ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone depletion, the nitrogen and the phosphorus cycles, global freshwater use, change in land use, biodiversity loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution. For the last two, atmospheric aerosol loading and chemical pollution, there are not yet adequate physical measures, but for the other seven processes clear boundaries have been designated. Three of the boundaries—those for climate change, ocean acidification, and stratospheric ozone depletion—can be regarded as tipping points, which at a certain level lead to vast qualitative changes in the earth system that would threaten to destabilize the planet, causing it to depart from the "boundaries for a healthy planet." The boundaries for the other four processes—the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, freshwater use, change in land use, and biodiversity loss—are better viewed as signifying the onset of irreversible environmental degradation. Three processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries: climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss. Each of these can therefore be seen, in our terminology, as constituting an extreme "rift" in the planetary system. Stratospheric ozone depletion was an emerging rift in the 1990s, but is now stabilizing, even subsiding. Ocean acidification, the phosphorus cycle, global freshwater use, and land system change are all rapidly emerging global rifts, though not yet extreme. Our knowledge of these rifts can be refined, and more plan-etary rifts may perhaps be discovered in the future. Nevertheless, the analysis of planetary boundaries and rifts, as they present themselves today, helps us understand the full scale of the ecological crisis now confronting humanity. The simple point is that the planet is being assaulted on many fronts as the result of human-generated changes in the global environment.4 In the planetary boundaries model developed by Rockstrom and his associates, each ecological process has a preindustrial value (that is, the level reached before the advent of industrial capitalism), a pro-posed boundary, and a current status. In the case of climate change the preindustrial value was 280 parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere; its proposed boundary is 350 ppm (necessary if tipping points such as a catastrophic rise in sea level are to be avoided); and its current status is 390 ppm. Biodiversity loss is measured by the rate of extinction (number of species lost per million species per year). The preindustrial annual rate, referred to as the "natural" or "background" rate of species loss, was 0.1-1 per million; the proposed boundary is 10 per million; whereas the current rate is greater than 100 per million (100-1,000 times the preindustrial back-ground rate). With respect to the nitrogen cycle, the boundary is con-cerned with the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere for human use in millions of tons per year. Before the rise of industrial capitalism (more specifically before the discovery of the Haber-Bosch process early in the twentieth century), the amount of nitrogen removed from the atmosphere was 0 tons. The proposed boundary, to avoid irreversible degradation of the earth system, is 35 million tons per year. The current status is 121 million tons per year. In each of these extreme rifts, the stability of the earth system as we know it is being endangered. We are at red alert status. If business as usual continues, the world is headed within the next few decades for major tipping points along with irreversible environmental degradation, threatening much of humanity. Biodiversity loss at current and projected rates could result in the loss of upward of a third of all living species this century. The pumping of more and more nitrogen into the biosphere is resulting in the creation of dead zones in lakes and ocean regions (a phenomenon also affected by phosphorus). Each one of these rifts by itself constitutes a global ecological crisis. These ruptures reveal that the limits of the earth system are not determined by the sheer physical scale of the economy but by the particular rifts in natural processes that are generated.5 The emerging rifts in the other ecological processes, which have not yet overshot their boundaries, are scarcely less threatening. For the phosphorus cycle (categorized as part of a single planetary boundary together with the nitrogen cycle), the preindustrial quantity flowing into the oceans per year was approximately 1 million tons; the proposed boundary is 11 million tons (based on the assumption that ocean anoxic events begin at ten times the background rate); and its current status is already 8.5 to 9.5 million tons. In regard to ocean acidification, the value refers to a global mean saturation state of arag-onite (a form of calcium carbonate) in surface seawater. A decline in the number indicates an increase in the acidity of the ocean. The preindustrial value was 3.44 (surface ocean aragonite saturation state); the proposed boundary—after which there would be a massive die-down of shell-forming organisms—is 2.75; and the current status is 2.90. In the case of freshwater use, the preindustrial annual consumption of freshwater in km3 (cubic kilometers) was 415; the estimated boundary is 4,000 km3 (marking a threshold beyond which the irreversible degradation and collapse of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems is likely); and the current rate of consumption is 2,600 km3. For change in land use, the parameters are set by the percentage of global ice-free land surface converted to cropland. In preindustrial times, this percentage was very low. The proposed boundary is 15 percent (after which there is the danger of triggering catastrophic effects on ecosystems), and the current status is 11.7 percent. In each of these emerging rifts, we are faced with an orange alert status, in which we are rapidly moving toward extreme conditions, whereby we will pass the planetary boundaries, undermining the earth system that supports the conditions of life. No measure for chemical pollution has yet been determined, but proposals include measuring the effects of persistent organic pollu-tants (otherwise known as POPs), plastics, endocrine disrupters, heavy metals, and nuclear waste on ecosystems and the earth system in general. Likewise, no measure has yet been determined for atmospheric aerosol loading (the overall particulate concentration in the atmosphere on a regional basis), which can disrupt monsoon systems, lead to health problems, and interact with climate change and freshwater boundaries. Stratospheric ozone depletion is the one previously emerging rift that was brought under control (as far as anthropogenic drivers were concerned) in the 1990s, reducing what was a rapidly growing threat to life on the planet due to an increase in ultraviolet radiation from the sun. The preindustrial value of ozone concentration was 290 (Dobson Units—the measurement of atmospheric ozone columnar density, where 1 Dobson Unit is defined as 0.01 millimeters thick under standard pressure and temperature); the proposed planetary boundary is a concentration of 276 (after which life on the planet would experience devastating losses); and the current status is 283. Between 60°S and 60°N latitude, the decline in stratospheric ozone concentrations has been halted. Nevertheless, it will take decades for the Antarctic ozone hole to disappear, and Arctic ozone loss will likely persist for decades. Life on the planet had a close call.6 The mapping out of planetary boundaries in this way gives us a better sense of the real threat to the earth system. Although in recent years the environmental threat has come to be seen by many as simply a question of climate change, protecting the planet requires that we attend to all of these planetary boundaries, and others not yet determined. The essential problem is the unavoidable fact that an expanding economic system is placing additional burdens on a fixed earth system to the point of planetary overload. It has been estimated that in the early 1960s humanity used half of the planet's biocapacity in a year. Today this has risen to an overshoot of 30 percent beyond the earth's regenerative capacity. Business-as-usual projections point to a state in which the ecological footprint of humanity will be equivalent to the regenerative capacity of two planets by the mid-2030s.7 Rockstrom and his associates concluded their article in Nature by stating: "The evidence so far suggests that, as along as the [planetary boundary] thresholds are not crossed, humanity has the freedom to pursue long-term social and economic development." Although this is undoubtedly true, what is obviously not addressed in this conclu-sion—but is clearly the point of their whole analysis—is that these thresholds have in some cases already been crossed and in other cases will soon be crossed with the continuation of business as usual. Moreover, this can be attributed in each and every case to a primary cause: the current pattern of global socioeconomic development, that is, the capitalist mode of production and its expansionary tendencies. The whole problem can be called "the global ecological rift," referring to the overall break in the human relation to nature arising from an alienated system of capital accumulation without end.'

#### Vote Neg to reject the Aff’s neoliberal economic engagement in favor of a commons-based approach. That solves and creates space to challenge neoliberalism

**De Angelis, East London political economy professor, 2003**

(Massimo, “Reflections on alternatives, commons and communities”, Winter, <http://www.commoner.org.uk/deangelis06.pdf>, DOA: 7-2-12, ldg)

This movement has posed the question of a plurality of “alternatives” to the social processes and arrangements that produce the horrors of modern global capital. In order to take the many calls for and practices of alternatives seriously, we have to make them relevant to the real people at the fringe or outside the movement. In other words, we want to move from movement to society not so much by persuading people to “join” our movement, but through a language and a political practice that by tracing the connections between diverse practices attempts to dissolve the distinctions between inside and outside the movement, i.e., actually moves ‘from movement to society’. To make the possibility of a new world that contains many worlds an actuality, we have to be able to shape our own discourse in such a way as to echo the needs and aspirations coming from below. We have to give coherence to their plurality, without imposing a model or reiterating dead ideologies. We need a discourse that helps to articulate the many alternatives that spring out of the points of crises of neoliberal capital, which seriously threaten to dispossess people of their livelihood and impose on them new or more intensified commodified patterns of life. We need a discourse that builds on the plurality of the many concrete struggles and their methods and help us to articulate a vision – not a plan – of the whole. Then we can better evaluate what are the global implications of our local struggles, as well as the local implications of global struggles for the building of a world that contains many worlds. But most of all, we need a discourse that recognizes the power we have to shape alternatives, at every level in society, that sets out from the simple fact that, contrarily to common belief, alternatives do exist, are everywhere and plural. To clarify, I think that every social node, that is every individual or network of individuals is a bearer of alternatives. This is evident not only when struggles erupt in any of the waged or unwaged local and trans-local nodes of social production. We just need to look around in the relative normality of daily routines to see that every social node “knows” of different ways to do things within its life-world and sphere of action longs for a different space in which things can be done in different ways. Each social node expresses needs and aspirations that are the basis of alternatives. For example: the alternative to working 10 hours a day is working 6; the alternative to poverty is access to the means of existence; the alternative to indignity is dignity; the alternative to building that dam and uprooting communities is not building that dam and leaving communities where they are; the alternative to tomatoes going rotten while transported on the back of an old woman for 20 miles is not GM tomatoes that do not rot, but access to land near home, or a home, or a road and a truck. Since every social node is aware of a spectrum of alternatives, the problem is simply how to make these alternatives actual? What resources are needed? How to coordinate alternatives in such a way that they are not pitted against each other as is the case of the competitive markets’ understanding of alternatives? How to solve the many existing problems without relying on the alienating coordinating mechanism of the market and creating instead social relations of mutual enrichment, dignity, and respect? These are I believe the bottom line questions on which a new political discourse must be based. Once we acknowledge the existence of the galaxy of alternatives as they emerge from concrete needs and aspirations, we can ground today’s new political discourse in the thinking and practice of the actualization and the coordination of alternatives, so as each social node and each individual within it has the power to decide and take control over their lives. It is this actualization and this coordination that rescues existing alternatives from the cloud of their invisibility, because alternatives, as with any human product, are social products, and they need to be recognized and validated socially. Our political projects must push their way through beyond the existing forms of coordination, beyond the visible fist of the state, beyond the invisible hand of competitive markets, and beyond the hard realities of their interconnections that express themselves in today forms of neoliberal governance, promoting cooperation through competition and community through disempowerment. As I will argue, this new political discourse is based on the project of defending and extending the space of commons, at the same time building and strengthening communities through the social fields.

### Tba

#### 1. Interpretation – “Its” is possessive of the USFG

Updegrave 91 (W.C., “Explanation of ZIP Code Address Purpose”, 8-19, <http://www.supremelaw.org/ref/zipcode/updegrav.htm>)

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

#### This means only direct aid and trade agreements – they’re third-party engagement

Daga 13 (Sergio Daga, director of research at Politicas Publicas para la Libertad, Bolivia, visiting senior policy analyst, Heritage Foundation, M.A. Economics, University of Chile, B.A. Economics, Catholic University of Bolivia, also trained at Libertad y Desarrollo, Chile, and the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, United States, “Economics of the 2013-2014 Debate Topic: U.S. Economic Engagement Toward Cuba, Mexico or Venezuela,” National Center for Policy Analysis, Debate Backgrounder No. 7, 5-15-2013, http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/Message\_to\_Debaters\_6-7-13.pdf)

Economics is the branch of human knowledge concerned with the ¶ satisfaction of human wants through the production of goods and ¶ services, and the exchange of those goods and services between two ¶ or more individuals. Thus, economics encompasses human activities ¶ from simple barter between two individuals to international trade ¶ between firms or governments. Many of these economic activities ¶ are regulated by government, and some are outlawed. Trade and ¶ other economic activities that cross national borders — such as ¶ sales of goods and services, travel, migration or transfers of money ¶ — are regulated by both the government of the originating country ¶ and the government of the destination country. The government ¶ itself could be an economic actor, buying and selling from other ¶ governments or firms in other countries; or the government could ¶ regulate the private economic activities of individuals and firms.¶ Economic engagement between or among countries can take ¶ many forms, but this document will focus on government-to-government engagement through 1) international trade agreements ¶ designed to lower barriers to trade; and 2) government foreign ¶ aid; next, we will contrast government-to-government economic ¶ engagement with private economic engagement through 3) ¶ international investment, called foreign direct investment; and 4) ¶ remittances and migration by individuals. All of these areas are ¶ important with respect to the countries mentioned in the debate ¶ resolution; however, when discussing economic engagement by ¶ the U.S. federal government, some issues are more important with ¶ respect to some countries than to others.

Increase means to make larger

Webster’s 13 – Webster’s Dictionary. 1913 ("Increase", http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/WEBSTER.sh?WORD=increase)

In\*crease" (?), v. i.

To become greater or more in size, quantity, number, degree, value, intensity, power, authority, reputation, wealth; to grow; to augment; to advance; -- opposed to *decrease*.

#### 2. Violation – the plan does not increase Federal Economic Engagement to a topic country via a BIT or FTA it instead unilaterally acts on previous engagement to increase private sector engagement.

#### Promoting investment in individual sectors is private NOT governmental engagement

Sullivan 8 (Daniel S. Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, which involves overseeing work on international trade and investment policy; international finance, development, and debt policy; economic sanctions, former Director and Acting Senior Director in the International Economics Directorate Director and Acting Senior Director in the International Economics Directorate in the National Security Council/National Economic Council Staff, graduated magna cum laude from Harvard University with a degree in Economics and graduated cum laude from Georgetown University with a J.D./Master of Science in Foreign Service joint degree, focusing on law, international economics, and national security studies, Remarks at the Inter-American Development Bank Annual Meeting: “Economic Engagement in the Americas,” April 6, 2008, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/rm/2008/105276.htm> Xu)

QUESTION: In regards to Uruguay-U.S. negotiations – what are some of the objectives for a commercial exchange with Uruguay? ASSISTANT SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Well again, I think one thing that’s been a very positive element of our engagement with Uruguay was the Bilateral Investment Treaty. That was the first new "model BIT" in the United States – very high level investor protection for both Uruguayan investors in the U.S. and U.S. investors there. We saw that as an important development of our relationship. I believe my colleague Edward Eissenstat from the USTR office has been to Uruguay a few times in the last year; focused on deepening our trade relationship. And I know there have been a number of discussions on ways to build on the bilateral investment treaty, which I think we’ve seen is very successful. I think we also have a trade investment framework agreement with Uruguay which is another way in which to deepen the relationship. And I think there’s a lot of interest in building on what we saw as positive movement, to move forward on the BIT. So, I think there’s a lot of enthusiasm on continuing to deepen our economic relationship with Uruguay and the United States. Yes. QUESTION: Business News Americas. What will be the impact of the Uruguay BIT on new investment? ASSISTANT SECRETARY SULLIVAN: Let me take your first question. With regard to specific sectors, as you know, those are private sector decisions. What’s important about the BIT is that it provides the protections to encourage deeper economic engagement through investment, through trade. The different sectors where that engagement might take place is going to be up to the Uruguayan and U.S. private sector interests, but we think that having the investment treaty is a very important spur to making that happen.

#### 1. Limits – direct talks places a functional limit on the topic – otherwise, any change in U.S. policy can be interpreted as engagement

#### 2. Ground – talks are a stable mechanism for topic disads and counterplans – that’s key to fairness

#### 3. They get unfair uniqueness tricks because the topical portion of the aff is the squo

#### Increase – even if the tba is Gov to Gov you do not increase the Gov to Gov part

Energy Solutions Forum 13 (Energy Solutions Forum; Energy; Senate Approves Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement Bill; 10-14-13; <http://breakingenergy.com/2013/10/23/senate-approves-transboundary-hydrocarbons-agreement-bill///BDS>)

On October 12, 2013, the Senate unanimously approved S. 812 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to implement the 2012 U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement. The agreement establishes a legal framework for offshore drilling at the Gulf of Mexico maritime border. The Mexican Senate ratified the agreement two months after it was signed by the U.S. and Mexico in February 2012. The agreement requires U.S. ratification before the February 2014 expiration date.¶ The legislation authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to take necessary actions to implement the agreement, including approval of unitization agreements and arrangements for oil and gas development from transboundary reservoirs and geological structures. It also approves disclosure of certain information related to oil and gas exploration, development, and production in the transboundary area.¶ The agreement would open more than one million acres on the Outer Continental Shelf for oil and gas development and facilitate common safety and environmental standards, ensuring that either country retains authority over activity in its waters. Importantly, the agreement would provide the legal certainty required to encourage investment in new energy development. On October 1, American Petroleum Institute provided testimony commending the legislation to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.¶ The House version of the legislation (H.R. 1613), approved by the House on June 27, includes a provision for exemption from Resources Extraction Reporting Requirement under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

### CP

#### Text: The President of the United States should issue an executive order to **substantially increase economic engagement toward Mexico by doing everything contained in HR 1613.**

#### XO solves the AFF – and Mexico is specifically asking for one

Fatka 13 (Jacqui Fatka, Feedstuffs, “Trade strengthening needed among NAFTA partners,” 10-3-2013, http://feedstuffs.com/story-trade-strengthening-needed-among-nafta-partners-45-103054)

In a joint letter to President Barack Obama, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, the main lobbying groups for large companies in the three countries said their members "continue to face obstacles to doing business across and within our borders."¶ The North American Free Trade Agreement was enacted nearly two decades ago in 1994. The letter signed by US Business Roundtable, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, and the Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios, explained, "As free trade agreements proliferate, we must achieve a seamless North American market to be competitive. The challenge before us is to move beyond pilot projects, feasibility studies and regulatory reviews to fuller implementation and longer term strategic action."¶ Today, Canada, Mexico, and the United States form a marketplace that includes more than 460 million consumers and represents one quarter of the world’s economy. At $19 trillion, this marketplace is larger than that of the EU and more than double the size of China. ¶ An estimated 14 million U.S. jobs are tied directly to trade with Canada and Mexico. Half of U.S. exports and imports to and from Canada and Mexico take place between related companies. Moreover, Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. manufacturers and service companies have been increasingly investing in each other’s countries over the last two decades. ¶ The letter noted that the international trade and investment landscape has changed dramatically, becoming much more competitive and opening up many new opportunities. "For these reasons, the time is ripe for Canada, Mexico, and the United States to respond to these new challenges and pursue new opportunities to enhance our global competitiveness," the letter stated.¶ The three countries are all participating in negotiations on a Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal with nine other nations that could offer a vehicle for upgrading NAFTA, but the business groups argue that even more can be done trilaterally.¶ Three broad areas were identified where more can be done by the respective governments to create a more integrated and competitive North American economic space. These areas are: (1) intelligent border systems; (2) greater regulatory cooperation; and (3) North American energy security and sustainability.¶ The groups applauded the fact that governments have recognized that a lack of regulatory cooperation is "handicapping the international competitiveness of Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. companies and have launched initiatives to address this problem." The issuance in May 2012 of an Executive Order (E.O. 13609) by President Obama aimed at eliminating and rolling back unnecessary regulatory differences that increase costs for companies doing business across the border is a "welcome step toward minimizing regulatory complexity," the groups said, adding that the Canadian and Mexican governments should issue similar directives.

### 1nc Obama cred nb

#### Obama cred is *low* because of failure to make *unilateral* engagement decisions – acting unilaterally re-establishes credibility

Luxner 13 (Larry Luxner, citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on matters of National Security and Foreign Policy, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Senior Research Professor of International Relations, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Counselor, Trustee and Co-Chair of the Advisory Board, Center for Strategic and International Studies, member of the International Advisory Board, Atlantic Council, “Brzezinski: Obama Must ‘Regain’ Lost Ground in Foreign Policy,” Washington Diplomat, 1-31-2013, http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=8841&Itemid=414)

Two days after the election that returned President Barack Obama to the White House for a second term, one of America's best-known former diplomats offered his take on the world — and the audience found his observations just as relevant as they were three decades ago.¶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security advisor under President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, didn't mince words when it came to Obama. "He has to undo the excessive reliance on speeches as he acts on the world scene — that is to say, the apparent assumption that a powerful speech on this or that subject is the same as effecting change," Brzezinski said. "The speeches all promised a great deal, but a great deal did not transpire. There was some marginal progress here and there, but by and large, his speeches remain speeches."¶ The Polish-American diplomat, 84, gave his own speech Nov. 8 at the Aspen Institute's Ambassadors' Security Roundtable luncheon at the Four Seasons hotel; moderating the discussion was CNN's Washington-based foreign affairs correspondent Jill Dougherty. In attendance were some 75 guests, including ambassadors representing a range of countries from Afghanistan to Zambia, as well as lobbyists, consultants and various State Department officials.¶ The event was part of the recent launch of the Ambassadors' Security Roundtable, a quarterly convening of ambassadors from around the world to promote greater international cooperation in the critical realm of security. The luncheon followed an off-the-record gathering of European envoys at the Aspen Institute's Wye River campus on Maryland's Eastern Shore in October.¶ Brzezinski, whom Dougherty introduced as a "living legend," said that in 2008, "at a lunch of this sort," he spoke of how impressed he was with the president-elect's "knowledge and understanding of the basic dynamics of this era."¶ Four years later, Brzezinski argued that Obama must reassert his credibility on the world stage through serious commitment and decisive action that will shape both his legacy and the country's trajectory.¶ "The management of our foreign policy and the protection of our national security are interwoven, and the president has no peer," Brzezinski said. "Congress is not a partner in the shaping of foreign policy. That is the special domain of the president, and he has to regain that territory."¶ It's territory Brzezinski has traversed for decades. During his time as Carter's national security advisor, Brzezinski oversaw the normalization of U.S. relations with China, the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, the rise of mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan, the growth of dissent in Soviet-influenced Eastern Europe, the signing of a treaty to relinquish U.S. control over the Panama Canal, and the brokering of the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel.¶ The chairman of countless commissions, task forces and councils, Brzezinski has been in the foreign policy trenches since the 1960s. The elder statesman remains active today, teaching at universities such as Harvard, Columbia and Johns Hopkins and writing numerous widely regarded books, including his most recent: "Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power."¶ In the 2012 book, Brzezinski argues that U.S. policymakers need to rethink the country's place in an interdependent world where America is no longer the sole superpower — adapting to shifting geopolitics while reasserting American influence in order to preserve global stability.¶ "Indeed, the ongoing changes in the distribution of global power and mounting global strife make it all the more imperative that America not retreat into an ignorant garrison-state mentality or wallow in self-righteous cultural hedonism. Such an America could cause the geopolitical prospects of an evolving world — in which the center of gravity is shifting from West to East — to become increasingly grave," he writes. "The world needs an America that is economically vital, socially appealing, responsibly powerful, strategically deliberate, internationally respected, and historically enlightened in its global engagement with the new East."

#### *Turns the case* – means US influence *backfires* – and triggers *economic instability* AND multiple scenarios for *global conflict*

SCMP 2K (South China Morning Post, “Position of Weakness” December 11, 2000, Lexis Nexis)

A weak president with an unclear mandate is bad news for the rest of the world. For better or worse, the person who rules the United States influences events far beyond the shores of his own country. Both the global economy and international politics will feel the effect of political instability in the US. The first impact will be on American financial markets, which will have a ripple effect on markets and growth across the world. A weakened US presidency will also be felt in global hotspots across the world. The Middle East, the conflict between India and Pakistan, peace on the Korean peninsula, and even the way relations between China and Taiwan play out, will be influenced by the authority the next US president brings to his job. There are those who would welcome a weakening of US global influence. Many Palestinians, for example, feel they would benefit from a less interventionist American policy in the Middle East. Even within the Western alliance, there are those who would probably see opportunities in a weakened US presidency. France, for example, might feel that a less assertive US might force the European Union to be more outward looking. But the dangers of having a weak, insecure US presidency outweigh any benefits that it might bring. US global economic and military power cannot be wished away. A president with a shaky mandate will still command great power and influence, only he will be constrained by his domestic weakness and less certain about how to use his authority. This brings with it the risks of miscalculation and the use of US power in a way that heightens conflict. There are very few conflicts in the world today which can be solved without US influence. The rest of the world needs the United States to use its power deftly and decisively.

### 1nc iran

#### Obama has sufficient PC to make and pass a deal on Iran now – but new agenda items overstretch focus and PC and trigger cascading prolif and war with Iran

Sabet 9-13 (Farzan Sabet, co-founder and editing manager of IranPolitik.com, doctoral student in International History and M.A. International History & Politics, Graduate Institute, Geneva, focused on international relations, international trade law, and Iranian domestic politics and foreign policy, “4: Iran: Resolving the Nuclear Crisis,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, September 2013, p.74-77, http://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2013/JPIA-2013-Final.pdf)

American President Barack Obama currently has an unprecedented opportunity to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. In¶ the first year of his second term, he has substantial political capital at home and a strong coalition of countries supporting his sanctions strategy and nuclear negotiations abroad. Just as¶ importantly, devastating economic sanctions since 2012 may¶ have increased the willingness of the Islamic Republic of Iran to¶ compromise¶ on its nuclear program. This policy paper argues¶ that President Obama should capitalize on this historic window¶ of opportunity by acknowledging Iran’s right to a peaceful¶ nuclear program and offering a roadmap for lifting sanctions in¶ exchange for deep concessions by Iran on its nuclear program.¶ The United States has not yet placed substantive sanctions relief on the table, and this may be the key to breaking the¶ deadlock in P5+1-Iran nuclear negotiations. However, the¶ current strong U.S. negotiating position will erode over time¶ and thus President Obama must take decisive action to resolve¶ the Iranian nuclear crisis.¶ INTRODUCTION¶ As President Barack Obama resettles into the White House and as pres¶ -¶ ident-elect Hassan Rouhani prepares to take on his new office, a historic¶ window of opportunity may exist for the United States of America and¶ the Islamic Republic of Iran to not only resolve the crisis over the contro¶ -¶ versial Iranian nuclear program but to also seek broader rapprochement.¶ There are, however, many obstacles in the path of successful negotiations.¶ Both sides will be under pressure from hardline domestic actors seeking¶ a continuation of the status quo. The United States will also be under¶ strong pressure from important allies abroad, including Israel and the Gulf¶ Cooperation Council (GCC), to extract maximum concessions from Iran.¶ The Islamic Republic, for its part, wants to project an image of strength¶ to foreign audiences and can only accept a deal which, at the very least,¶ allows it to save face (Mousavian 2013). This creates constraints on the¶ both sides, limiting the range of possible agreements.¶ Failure to reach a negotiated settlement, however, could have potentially¶ catastrophic consequences for American interests. At one extreme, this¶ failure may allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapons capability, shifting the¶ balance of power in the Middle East and beginning a nuclear proliferation cascade. The Obama administration, however, has ruled out a situation in¶ which the United States is forced to contain a nuclear weapon-latent Iran.¶ At the other extreme, the United States may have to carry out military operations on Iranian nuclear facilities, an option which could temporar¶ -¶ ily set back the Iranian nuclear program but would likely have disastrous¶ humanitarian consequences and lead to a regional conflagration. An attack¶ could also give Iran a justification to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation¶ Treaty (NPT) and make a dash for nuclear weapons, undermining the¶ cause of nuclear non-proliferation. The Iranian nuclear crisis is thus one¶ of the most important international security issues today.¶ Since the failure of the first round of negotiations between the Obama¶ administration and the Islamic Republic in October 2009, the United¶ States has pursued a “comprehensivizing” and “multilateralizing” economic¶ sanctions strategy. This means that the United States has expanded the¶ scope of sanctions to broader swaths of the Iranian economy, particularly¶ its financial and petroleum sector, and multiplied the number of actors¶ complying with sanctions. Since the five permanent members of the¶ United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) and the Islamic¶ Republic resumed high level political negotiations in February 2013, a¶ question has hung in the air: Has the Obama administration’s sanctions¶ strategy sufficiently changed Iran’s cost-benefit analysis to make a nuclear¶ deal more likely?¶ This policy paper argues that this is the case. More specifically, it argues ¶ that by applying sanctions to Iran the United States has increased the costs of¶ failing to reach an agreement for Tehran. Sanctions appear to have strongly¶ contributed to the rapid deterioration of the Iranian economy since at least¶ 2012. What this means for Iran is that the price of continuing its nuclear¶ program on the current trajectory is no longer diplomatic condemnation¶ or vague threats of military action but deteriorating social conditions and¶ severe economic pain that it can measure in the billions of dollars. While¶ sanctions have largely succeeded as a mechanism of economic pain, this¶ paper argues that expectations of what sanctions can achieve should be¶ tempered and that pain must be applied in a broader framework that¶ also includes incentives. As such, while sanctions have made a negotiated¶ settlement of the nuclear crisis more likely, they cannot be relied upon to¶ achieve a breakthrough by themselves. Negotiations must ultimately offer¶ acknowledgement of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program under the¶ NPT and a viable road map for lifting sanctions if they are to succeed.¶ While President Obama’s re-election, Rouhani’s election, and the¶ relative success of sanctions thus far provide a window of opportunity for¶ a mutually beneficial negotiated settlement of the nuclear crisis, several¶ factors may erode the current strong U.S. position over time. First, as¶ time passes, other policy priorities will divide the Obama administration’s attention and political capital, weakening its ability to sell a negotiated settlement at home. Second, the Islamic Republic is already mitigating¶ some of the effects of sanctions through a variety of methods, decreasing¶ sanctions’ value as a bargaining chip for the United States. Finally, the¶ P5+1 and sanctions coalitions may begin to unravel over a wide range of¶ issues, such as the attractiveness of Iranian petroleum resources at steep¶ discounts or the humanitarian impact of sanctions, reducing the impact¶ of sanctions and the international momentum for a negotiated settlement.¶ Time is thus of the essence.¶ Based on these observations this paper proposes four specific policy¶ recommendations for the U.S. strategy toward P5+1-Iran nuclear negotia¶ -¶ tions, taking into account both domestic, foreign, and temporal factors.¶ First, President Obama should end the dual-track strategy as it is currently¶ conceived. This means halting the expansion of the Iran sanctions regime¶ by the U.S. Congress while negotiations are ongoing, as this may encourage Iran to escalate its nuclear program to maintain the balance of power¶ in negotiations. Second, President Obama can offer to help suspend E.U.¶ and some U.S. sanctions in exchange for suspensions of elements of the¶ Iranian nuclear program. This suspension-for-suspension proposal creates¶ further trust and builds momentum. Third, President Obama should use ¶ this momentum to reach a final agreement. A final resolution of the nuclear¶ crisis will require the Obama administration to offer both acknowledge¶ -¶ ment of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program and a viable road map¶ for sanctions relief. Fourth, the Obama administration must put in place¶ guarantees that make any final agreement lasting. This paper makes its¶ case in three parts. Part one briefly reviews the historical background of¶ the Iranian nuclear crisis. Part two argues that current conditions could¶ allow for a mutually acceptable deal, but that this window of opportunity¶ will not last forever. Part three lays out the four policy proposals in detail.

Link their hill card concedes: The House on Thursday passed a bill that would implement a U.S.-Mexico agreement on offshore energy development on the countries' maritime border despite opposition from Democrats who called it an attack on the Dodd-Frank financial reform law.¶

#### War with Iran causes extinction

Hirsch 5 (Jorge, Professor of Physics, University of California, San Diego, Ph.D., University of Chicago, “Can a Nuclear Strike on Iran Be Averted”, 11-21-2005, <http://www.antiwar.com/orig/hirsch.php?articleid=8089>)

Now that we have outlined what is very close to happening, let us discuss briefly why everything possible should be done to prevent it. In a worst-case scenario, the attack will cause a violent reaction from Iran. Millions of "human wave" Iranian militias will storm into Iraq, and just as Saddam stopped them with chemical weapons, the U.S. will stop them with nuclear weapons, resulting potentially in hundreds of thousands of casualties. The Middle East will explode, and popular uprisings in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries with pro-Western governments could be overtaken by radical regimes. Pakistan already has nuclear weapons, and a nuclear conflict could even lead to Russia's and Israel's involvement using nuclear weapons. In a best-case scenario, the U.S. will destroy all nuclear, chemical, and missile facilities in Iran with conventional and low-yield nuclear weapons in a lightning surprise attack, and Iran will be paralyzed and decide not to retaliate for fear of a vastly more devastating nuclear attack. In the short term, the U.S. will succeed, leaving no Iranian nuclear program, civilian or otherwise. Iran will no longer threaten Israel, a regime change will ensue, and a pro-Western government will emerge. However, even in the best-case scenario, the long-term consequences are dire. The nuclear threshold will have been crossed by a nuclear superpower against a non-nuclear country. Many more countries will rush to get their own nuclear weapons as a deterrent. With no taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, they will certainly be used again. Nuclear conflicts will occur within the next 10 to 20 years, and will escalate until much of the world is destroyed. Let us remember that the destructive power of existing nuclear arsenals is approximately one million times that of the Hiroshima bomb, enough to erase Earth's population many times over.

#### Cascading prolif causes extinction

Kroenig 12 (Matthew Kroenig, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, former CFR International Affairs Fellow in the Department of Defense, former strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ph.D., M.A. Political Science, University of California Berkeley, A.B. History, University of Missouri, “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have A Future?” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 5-26-2012, <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1182&tid=30>)

Proliferation Optimism: Proliferation optimism was revived in the academy in Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 book, Theory of International Politics.[[1]](#footnote-1)[29] In this, and subsequent works, Waltz argued that the spread of nuclear weapons has beneficial effects on international politics. He maintained that states, fearing a catastrophic nuclear war, will be deterred from going to war with other nuclear-armed states. As more and more states acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, there are fewer states against which other states will be willing to wage war. The spread of nuclear weapons, according to Waltz, leads to greater levels of international stability. Looking to the empirical record, he argued that the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945 coincided with an unprecedented period of peace among the great powers. While the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in many proxy wars in peripheral geographic regions during the Cold War, they never engaged in direct combat. And, despite regional scuffles involving nuclear-armed states in the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, none of these conflicts resulted in a major theater war. This lid on the intensity of conflict, according to Waltz, was the direct result of the stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons. Following in the path blazed by the strategic thinkers reviewed above, Waltz argued that the requirements for deterrence are not high. He argued that, contrary to the behavior of the Cold War superpowers, a state need not build a large arsenal with multiple survivable delivery vehicles in order to deter its adversaries. Rather, he claimed that a few nuclear weapons are sufficient for deterrence. Indeed, he even went further, asserting that any state will be deterred even if it merely suspects its opponent might have a few nuclear weapons because the costs of getting it wrong are simply too high. Not even nuclear accident is a concern according to Waltz because leaders in nuclear-armed states understand that if they ever lost control of nuclear weapons, resulting in an accidental nuclear exchange, the nuclear retaliation they would suffer in response would be catastrophic. Nuclear-armed states, therefore, have strong incentives to maintain control of their nuclear weapons. Not even new nuclear states, without experience in managing nuclear arsenals, would ever allow nuclear weapons to be used or let them fall in the wrong hands. Following Waltz, many other scholars have advanced arguments in the proliferation optimist school. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquite and William Riker explore the “merits of selective nuclear proliferation.”[[2]](#footnote-2)[30] John Mearsheimer made the case for a “Ukrainian nuclear deterrent,” following the collapse of the Soviet Union.[[3]](#footnote-3)[31] In the run up to the 2003 Gulf War, John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt argued that we should not worry about a nuclear-armed Iraq because a nuclear-armed Iraq can be deterred.[[4]](#footnote-4)[32] And, in recent years, Barry Posen and many other realists have argued that nuclear proliferation in Iran does not pose a threat, again arguing that a nuclear-armed Iran can be deterred.[[5]](#footnote-5)[33] What’s Wrong with Proliferation Optimism? The proliferation optimist position, while having a distinguished pedigree, has several major problems. Many of these weaknesses have been chronicled in brilliant detail by Scott Sagan and other contemporary proliferation pessimists.[[6]](#footnote-6)[34] Rather than repeat these substantial efforts, I will use this section to offer some original critiques of the recent incarnations of proliferation optimism. First and foremost, proliferation optimists do not appear to understand contemporary deterrence theory. I do not say this lightly in an effort to marginalize or discredit my intellectual opponents. Rather, I make this claim with all due caution and with complete sincerity. A careful review of the contemporary proliferation optimism literature does not reflect an understanding of, or engagement with, the developments in academic deterrence theory in top scholarly journals such as the American Political Science Review and International Organization over the past few decades.[[7]](#footnote-7)[35] While early optimists like Viner and Brodie can be excused for not knowing better, the writings of contemporary proliferation optimists ignore the past fifty years of academic research on nuclear deterrence theory. In the 1940s, Viner, Brodie, and others argued that the advent of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) rendered war among major powers obsolete, but nuclear deterrence theory soon advanced beyond that simple understanding.[[8]](#footnote-8)[36] After all, great power political competition does not end with nuclear weapons. And nuclear-armed states still seek to threaten nuclear-armed adversaries. States cannot credibly threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they still want to coerce their adversaries. This leads to a credibility problem: how can states credibly threaten a nuclear-armed opponent? Since the 1960s academic nuclear deterrence theory has been devoted almost exclusively to answering this question.[[9]](#footnote-9)[37] And, unfortunately for proliferation optimists, the answers do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed opponents.[[10]](#footnote-10)[38] He argued that leaders cannot credibly threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but they can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[[11]](#footnote-11)[39] They can engage in a process, the nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. As states escalate a nuclear crisis there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest risk of nuclear war before back down will win the crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for this reason that Thomas Schelling called great power politics in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”[[12]](#footnote-12)[40] This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Or they can the escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear exchange. Since 1945 there were have been many high stakes nuclear crises (by my count, there have been twenty) in which “rational” states like the United States run a risk of nuclear war and inch very close to the brink of nuclear war.[[13]](#footnote-13)[41] By asking whether states can be deterred or not, therefore, proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis? Optimists are likely correct when they assert that Iran will not intentionally commit national suicide by launching a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack on the United States or Israel. This does not mean that Iran will never use nuclear weapons, however. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable to think that a nuclear-armed Iran would not, at some point, find itself in a crisis with another nuclear-armed power and that it would not be willing to run any risk of nuclear war in order to achieve its objectives. If a nuclear-armed Iran and the United States or Israel have a geopolitical conflict in the future, over say the internal politics of Syria, an Israeli conflict with Iran’s client Hezbollah, the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, passage through the Strait of Hormuz, or some other issue, do we believe that Iran would immediately capitulate? Or is it possible that Iran would push back, possibly even brandishing nuclear weapons in an attempt to deter its adversaries? If the latter, there is a real risk that proliferation to Iran could result in nuclear war. An optimist might counter that nuclear weapons will never be used, even in a crisis situation, because states have such a strong incentive, namely national survival, to ensure that nuclear weapons are not used. But, this objection ignores the fact that leaders operate under competing pressures. Leaders in nuclear-armed states also have very strong incentives to convince their adversaries that nuclear weapons could very well be used. Historically we have seen that in crises, leaders purposely do things like put nuclear weapons on high alert and delegate[d] nuclear launch authority to low level commanders, purposely increasing the risk of accidental nuclear war in an attempt to force less-resolved opponents to back down. Moreover, not even the optimists’ first principles about the irrelevance of nuclear posture stand up to scrutiny. Not all nuclear wars would be equally devastating.[[14]](#footnote-14)[42] Any nuclear exchange would have devastating consequences no doubt, but, if a crisis were to spiral out of control and result in nuclear war, any sane leader would rather be facing a country with five nuclear weapons than one with thirty-five thousand. Similarly, any sane leader would be willing to run a greater risk of nuclear war against the former state than against the latter. Indeed, systematic research has demonstrated that states are willing to run greater risks and, therefore, more likely to win nuclear crises when they enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponent.[[15]](#footnote-15)[43] Proliferation optimists miss this point, however, because they are still mired in 1940s deterrence theory. It is true that no rational leader would choose to launch a nuclear war, but, depending on the context, she would almost certainly be willing to risk one. Nuclear deterrence theorists have proposed a second scenario under which rational leaders could instigate a nuclear exchange: a limited nuclear war.[[16]](#footnote-16)[44] By launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city, for example, it was thought that a nuclear-armed state could signal its willingness to escalate the crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale nuclear response. In a future crisis between a nuclear-armed China and the United States over Taiwan, for example, China could choose to launch a nuclear attack on Honolulu to demonstrate its seriousness. In that situation, with the continental United States intact, would Washington choose to launch a full-scale nuclear war on China that could result in the destruction of many more American cities? Or would it back down? China might decide to strike hoping that Washington will choose a humiliating retreat over a full-scale nuclear war. If launching a limited nuclear war could be rational, it follows that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the risk of nuclear use. Again, by ignoring contemporary developments in scholarly discourse and relying exclusively on understandings of nuclear deterrence theory that became obsolete decades ago, optimists reveal the shortcomings of their analysis and fail to make a compelling case. The optimists also error by confusing stability for the national interest. Even if the spread of nuclear weapons contributes to greater levels of international stability (which discussions above and below suggest it might not) it does not necessarily follow that the spread of nuclear weapons is in the U.S. interest. There might be other national goals that trump stability, such as reducing to zero the risk of nuclear war in an important geopolitical region. Optimists might argue that South Asia is more stable when India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, but certainly the risk of nuclear war is higher than if there were no nuclear weapons on the subcontinent. In addition, it is wrong to assume that stability is always in the national interest. Sometimes it is, but sometimes it is not. If stability is obtained because Washington is deterred from using force against a nuclear-armed adversary in a situation where using force could have advanced national goals, stability harms, rather than advances, U.S. national interests. The final gaping weakness in the proliferation optimist argument, however, is that it rests on a logical contradiction. This is particularly ironic, given that many optimists like to portray themselves as hard-headed thinkers, following their premises to their logical conclusions. But, the contradiction at the heart of the optimist argument is glaring and simple to understand: either the probability of nuclear war is zero, or it is nonzero, but it cannot be both. If the probability of nuclear war is zero, then nuclear weapons should have no deterrent effect. States will not be deterred by a nuclear war that could never occur and states should be willing to intentionally launch large-scale wars against nuclear-armed states. In this case, proliferation optimists cannot conclude that the spread of nuclear weapons is stabilizing. If, on the other hand, the probability of nuclear war is nonzero, then there is a real danger that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the probability of a catastrophic nuclear war. If this is true, then proliferation optimists cannot be certain that nuclear weapons will never be used. In sum, the spread of nuclear weapons can either raise the risk of nuclear war and in so doing, deter large-scale conventional conflict. Or there is no danger that nuclear weapons will be used and the spread of nuclear weapons does not increase international instability. But, despite the claims of the proliferation optimists, it is nonsensical to argue that nuclear weapons will never be used and to simultaneously claim that their spread contributes to international stability. Proliferation Anti-obsessionists: Other scholars, who I label “anti-obsessionists” argue that the spread of nuclear weapons has neither been good nor bad for international politics, but rather irrelevant. They argue that academics and policymakers concerned about nuclear proliferation spend too much time and energy obsessing over something, nuclear weapons, that, at the end of the day, are not all that important. In Atomic Obsession, John Mueller argues that widespread fears about the threat of nuclear weapons are overblown.[[17]](#footnote-17)[45] He acknowledges that policymakers and experts have often worried that the spread of nuclear weapons could lead to nuclear war, nuclear terrorism and cascades of nuclear proliferation, but he then sets about systematically dismantling each of these fears. Rather, he contends that nuclear weapons have had little effect on the conduct of international diplomacy and that world history would have been roughly the same had nuclear weapons never been invented. Finally, Mueller concludes by arguing that the real problem is not nuclear proliferation, but nuclear nonproliferation policy because states do harmful things in the name of nonproliferation, like take military action and deny countries access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Similarly, Ward Wilson argues that, despite the belief held by optimists and pessimists alike, nuclear weapons are not useful tools of deterrence.[[18]](#footnote-18)[46] In his study of the end of World War II, for example, Wilson argues that it was not the U.S. use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki that forced Japanese surrender, but a variety of other factors, including the Soviet Union’s decision to enter the war. If the actual use of nuclear weapons was not enough to convince a country to capitulate to its opponent he argues, then there is little reason to think that the mere threat of nuclear use has been important to keeping the peace over the past half century. Leaders of nuclear-armed states justify nuclear possession by touting their deterrent benefits, but if nuclear weapons have no deterrent value, there is no reason, Ward claims, not to simply get rid of them. Finally, Anne Harrington de Santana argues that nuclear experts “fetishize” nuclear weapons.[[19]](#footnote-19)[47] Just like capitalists, according to Karl Marx, bestow magical qualities on money, thus fetishizing it, she argues that leaders and national security experts do the same thing to nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence as a critical component of national security strategy, according to Harrington de Santana, is not inherent in the technology of nuclear weapons themselves, but is rather the result of how leaders in countries around the world think about them. In short, she argues, “Nuclear weapons are powerful because we treat them as powerful.”[[20]](#footnote-20)[48] But, she maintains, we could just as easily “defetish” them, treating them as unimportant and, therefore, rendering them obsolete. She concludes that “Perhaps some day, the deactivated nuclear weapons on display in museums across the United States will be nothing more than a reminder of how powerful nuclear weapons used to be.”[[21]](#footnote-21)[49] The anti-obsessionists make some thought-provoking points and may help to reign in some of the most hyperbolic accounts of the effect of nuclear proliferation. They remind us, for example, that our worst fears have not been realized, at least not yet. Yet, by taking the next step and arguing that nuclear weapons have been, and will continue to be, irrelevant, they go too far. Their arguments call to mind the story about the man who jumps to his death from the top of a New York City skyscraper and, when asked how things are going as he passes the 15th story window, replies, “so far so good.” The idea that world history would have been largely unchanged had nuclear weapons not been invented is a provocative one, but it is also unfalsifiable. There is good reason to believe that world history would have been different, and in many ways better, had certain countries not acquired nuclear weapons. Let’s take Pakistan as an example. Pakistan officially joined the ranks of the nuclear powers in May 1998 when it followed India in conducting a series of nuclear tests. Since then, Pakistan has been a poster child for the possible negative consequences of nuclear proliferation. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have led to further nuclear proliferation as Pakistan, with the help of rogue scientist A.Q. Khan, transferred uranium enrichment technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.[[22]](#footnote-22)[50] Indeed, part of the reason that North Korea and Iran are so far along with their uranium enrichment programs is because they got help from Pakistan. Pakistan has also become more aggressive since acquiring nuclear weapons, displaying an increased willingness to sponsor cross-border incursions into India with terrorists and irregular forces.[[23]](#footnote-23)[51] In a number of high-stakes nuclear crises between India and Pakistan, U.S. officials worried that the conflicts could escalate to a nuclear exchange and intervened diplomatically to prevent Armageddon on the subcontinent. The U.S. government also worries about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, fearing that Pakistan’s nukes could fall into the hands of terrorists in the event of a state collapse or a break down in nuclear security. And we still have not witnessed the full range of consequences arising from Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Islamabad has only possessed the bomb for a little over a decade, but they are likely to keep it for decades to come, meaning that we could still have a nuclear war involving Pakistan. In short, Pakistan’s nuclear capability has already had deleterious effects on U.S. national security and these threats are only likely to grow over time. In addition, the anti-obsessionists are incorrect to argue that the cure of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy is worse than the disease of proliferation. Many observers would agree with Mueller that the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a disaster, costing much in the way of blood and treasure and offering little strategic benefit. But the Iraq War is hardly representative of U.S. nonproliferation policy. For the most part, nonproliferation policy operates in the mundane realm of legal frameworks, negotiations, inspections, sanctions, and a variety of other tools. Even occasional preventive military strikes on nuclear facilities have been far less calamitous than the Iraq War. Indeed, the Israeli strikes on nuclear reactors in Iraq and Syria in 1981 and 2007, respectively, produced no meaningful military retaliation and a muted international response. Moreover, the idea that the Iraq War was primarily about nuclear nonproliferation is a contestable one, with Saddam Hussein’s history of aggression, the unsustainability of maintaining the pre-war containment regime indefinitely, Saddam’s ties to terrorist groups, his past possession and use of chemical and biological weapons, and the window of opportunity created by September 11th, all serving as possible prompts for U.S. military action in the Spring of 2003. The claim that nonproliferation policy is dangerous because it denies developing countries access to nuclear energy also rests on shaky ground. If anything, the global nonproliferation regime has, on balance, increased access to nuclear technology. Does anyone really believe that countries like Algeria, Congo, and Vietnam would have nuclear reactors today were it not for Atoms for Peace, Article IV of the NPT, and other appendages of the nonproliferation regime that have provided developing states with nuclear technology in exchange for promises to forgo nuclear weapons development? Moreover, the sensitive fuel-cycle technology denied by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and other supply control regimes is not even necessary to the development of a vibrant nuclear energy program as the many countries that have fuel-cycle services provided by foreign nuclear suppliers clearly demonstrate. Finally, the notion that nuclear energy is somehow the key to lifting developing countries from third to first world status does not pass the laugh test. Given the large upfront investments, the cost of back-end fuel management and storage, and the ever-present danger of environmental catastrophe exemplified most recently by the Fukushima disaster in Japan, many argue that nuclear energy is not a cost-effective source of energy (if all the externalities are taken into account) for any country, not to mention those developing states least able to manage these myriad challenges. Taken together, therefore, the argument that nuclear nonproliferation policy is more dangerous than the consequences of nuclear proliferation, including possible nuclear war, is untenable. Indeed, it would certainly come as a surprise to the mild mannered diplomats and scientists who staff the International Atomic Energy Agency, the global focal point of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, located in Vienna, Austria. The anti-obsessionsists, like the optimists, also walk themselves into logical contradictions. In this case, their policy recommendations do not necessarily follow from their analyses. Ward argues that nuclear weapons are irrelevant and, therefore, we should eliminate them.[[24]](#footnote-24)[52] But, if nuclear weapons are really so irrelevant, why not just keep them lying around? They will not cause any problems if they are as meaningless as anti-obsessionists claim and it is certainly more cost effective to do nothing than to negotiate complicated international treaties and dismantle thousands of warheads, delivery vehicles, and their associated facilities. Finally, the idea that nuclear weapons are only important because we think they are powerful is arresting, but false. There are properties inherent in nuclear weapons that can be used to create military effects that simply cannot, at least not yet, be replicated with conventional munitions. If a military planner wants to quickly destroy a city on the other side of the planet, his only option today is a nuclear weapon mounted on an ICBM. Therefore, if the collective “we” suddenly decided to “defetishize” nuclear weapons by treating them as unimportant, it is implausible that some leader somewhere would not independently come to the idea that nuclear weapons could advance his or her country’s national security and thereby re-fetishize them. In short, the optimists and anti-obsessionists have brought an important perspective to the nonproliferation debate. Their arguments are provocative and they raise the bar for those who wish to argue that the spread of nuclear weapons is indeed a problem. Nevertheless, their counterintuitive arguments are not enough to wish away the enormous security challenges posed by the spread of the world’s most dangerous weapons. These myriad threats will be considered in the next section. Why Nuclear Proliferation Is a Problem The spread of nuclear weapons poses a number of severe threats to international peace and U.S. national security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, emboldened nuclear powers, constrained freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. This section explores each of these threats in turn. Nuclear War. The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there is a catastrophic nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between the two superpowers during the Cold War could have arguably resulted in human extinction and a nuclear exchange between states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, could still result in millions of deaths and casualties, billions of dollars of economic devastation, environmental degradation, and a parade of other horrors. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used one nuclear weapon each on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to sixty-five-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the great depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting in the later 1990s and the Great Recession of the late Naughts.[[25]](#footnote-25)[53] This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used in my lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities and eliminate the threat of nuclear war against Israel. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use ‘em or loose ‘em pressures. That is, if Tehran believes that Israel might launch a preemptive strike, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.[[26]](#footnote-26)[54] If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. In a future Israeli-Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, there is a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders that would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. For example, Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who genuinely hold millenarian religious worldviews who could one day ascend to power and have their finger on the nuclear trigger. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, one leader will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine a nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. This leads to the credibility problem that is at the heart of modern deterrence theory: how can you threaten to launch a suicidal nuclear war? Deterrence theorists have devised at least two answers to this question. First, as stated above, leaders can choose to launch a limited nuclear war.[[27]](#footnote-27)[55] This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional military inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly. During the Cold War, the United States was willing to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority in continental Europe. As Russia’s conventional military power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear use in its strategic doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a U.S. superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above leaders can make a “threat that leaves something to chance.”[[28]](#footnote-28)[56] They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents could have led to war.[[29]](#footnote-29)[57] When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as India and Pakistan and Iran and Israel, there are fewer sources of stability that existed during the Cold War, meaning that there is a very real risk that a future Middle East crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange.

## Heg

### 1nc sq solves relations

#### Status solves their relations advantage – Nieto and Obama meeting sends a sufficient signal

Reyes 4-29 (Paul A Reyes, attorney and member of the USA Today Board of Contributors, “Opinion: President Obama has the chance to improve US/Mexico relations,” NBC Latino, April 29, 2013, <http://nbclatino.com/2013/04/29/opinion-president-obama-has-the-chance-to-improve-usmexico-relations/>)

¶ This week, President Obama is off to Mexico and Costa Rica for a three-day trip starting Thursday. A White House statement said that the trip is ”is an important opportunity to reinforce the deep cultural, familial and economic ties that so many Americans share with Mexico and Central America.” Obama plans to meet with Mexico’s President Enrique Peña Nieto to discuss economic and trade issues. His last visit to Mexico was in June, for the G-20 summit in Los Cabos.¶ ¶ The U.S. and Mexico are as tightly bound as siblings, and often just as dysfunctional. While both governments are concerned with immigration and drug violence, President Obama must forge a more positive, productive partnership. Mexico is enjoying remarkable economic growth, and Obama neglects our southern neighbor at his own peril.¶ ¶ Obama will arrive in Mexico with good and bad news. On the positive side, he can highlight the progress his administration has made towards overhauling our immigration system. The border is more secure than ever, and the Senate has unveiled a proposal that creates new pathways for legal immigration. On the negative side, Obama bears responsibility for his failure to reform U.S. gun laws. ThinkProgress reports that the expiration of the assault weapons ban has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Mexicans in cartel violence. Even worse, America’s demand for illegal drugs fuels the growth of these cartels. ¶ ¶ However, Obama would be wise to recognize that relations with Mexico should not center on these issues alone. As president-elect, Peña Nieto wrote in The Washington Post that, “It is a mistake to limit our bilateral relationship to drugs and security concerns. Our mutual interests are too vast and complex to be restricted in this short-sighted way.” He wants a deeper relationship, one that is defined by shared economic goals.¶ ¶ That’s the smart way forward. Since 2008, Mexico has seen steady economic growth, which has been a net benefit to the U.S. The U.S. exports more to Mexico than to China and Japan combined, and U.S./Mexico trade hit almost $500 billion in 2012. Obama should build on these ties to create greater economic integration. If he and Peña Nieto were to collaborate on ways of matching Mexico’s young labor force with American technology and training, it would be a recipe for a regional economic boom. Greater U.S. investment in Mexico will make the country safer, as the cartels generally leave multinational operations alone.¶ ¶ Politically, Obama cannot afford to take Mexico for granted. Consider that Mexico has been fully engaged with Cuba since the revolution in 1959 (which was launched from Mexico). And although the U.S. has not recognized Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro as successor to Hugo Chavez, Mexico recognized his election on April 19. So Mexico is not an ally that automatically falls in lockstep with American interests. Perhaps with more attention from the Obama administration, Peña Nieto could be persuaded to be more supportive of U.S. policies for the region.¶ ¶ True, there are legitimate reasons why Mexico has been viewed warily by past administrations. Mexico has historically been the largest source of our undocumented population. Border towns have long feared spillover violence from the drug cartels. But illegal immigration is at net zero, and the fears of violence on the U.S. side of the border have proved largely unfounded. Obama should take the lead in encouraging more communication and cooperation with Mexico. Already, Peña Nieto favors opening Mexico’s energy sector to private investment, and he may even allow foreign investment in its state oil company.¶ ¶ President Obama has the chance to turn a page in U.S./Mexico relations, and he should not miss it. It’s time for a foreign policy with Mexico based on its potential, not on its problems.

### 1nc alt causes to relations

#### Alt cause to relations – drug war

Walser 5-2 (Ray Walser, veteran Foreign Service officer, is a Senior Policy Analyst specializing in Latin America at The Heritage Foundation, “President Obama, the Drug War, and Mexico: Failure Is an Option.” The Foundary. May 2, 2013. <http://blog.heritage.org/2013/05/02/president-obama-the-drug-war-and-mexico-failure-is-an-option/>)

The White House still retains the power to set the national agenda and frame the political conversation at home and abroad. In his last conversation relating to drug issues in December 2012, President Obama, when asked about the passage of marijuana legalization laws in Colorado and the state of Washington, responded that the federal government had “[bigger fish to fry](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/12/14/obama-ive-got-bigger-fish-to-fry-than-pot-smokers/).”¶ These state laws run contrary to federal law and U.S. treaty obligations. Then-president Felipe Calderon of Mexico angrily fired back, questioning U.S. “[moral authority](http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/11/14/mexico-prez-us-lacks-moral-authority-for-drug-war/).” When interviewed by the American Quarterly about his Mexican trip, the President [answered no questions](http://www.americasquarterly.org/aq-interviews-barack-obama-about-trip-to-mexico-and-costa-rica) about drug trafficking. In Mexico this week, Obama will talk trade, immigration reform, education, and dance diplomatically around the drug issue.¶ [Fresh friction](http://blog.heritage.org/2013/05/01/obama-in-mexico-change-the-reality-not-the-conversation/) has emerged between the U.S. and Mexico over rules for counter-drug intelligence collection and sharing. Mexico’s current president, Enrique Peña Nieto appears to be concentrating on more centralized control over drug collection and operations on Mexican territory. Concerned about citizen security, Peña Nieto hopes to reduce the harm done to ordinary Mexicans as drugs flow across his nation’s territory to U.S. consumers. At the back of his mind also is a recognition that he is dealing with the same Administration that launched Operation [Fast and Furious](http://blog.heritage.org/2012/11/16/fast-and-furious-marijuana-legalization-still-worry-our-southern-neighbors/), which let guns walk across the border, and that argues marijuana legalization in Colorado and Washington is no big deal.

### China

#### Chinese international influence is an existential impact – it controls every scenario for extinction

Zhang ‘12

[Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm ]

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including widespread poverty, international conflict, the clash of civilizations and environmental protection. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the emission of greenhouse gases. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

#### China’s engagement in Latin America is key to CCP stability.

**Farnsworth, 12** – Vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC (Eric, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)//VP

What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.

#### CCP instability leads to nuclear war.

**Rexing, 05** – Staff Writer (San, “The CCP’s Last Ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War”, Epoch Times, 8/5, http://english.epochtimes.com/ news/5-8-5/30975.html)//VP

What, then, is the gist of this wild, last-ditch gamble? To put it in a few words: A cornered beast is fighting desperately to survive in a battle with humanity. If you don’t believe me, read some passages directly from the speeches. 1) “We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the US], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone!” 2) “In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished.” 3) “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else!” Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

## Pemex

### 1nc sq solves Pemex

#### Status quo solves PEMEX production

WSJ 3-2 (Wall Street Journal, 3/2/13, “Pemex Executive Says Oil Output Set to Rise,” March 2, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323978104578336673832410166.html?mod=googlenews\_wsj)

Mexico's level of crude-oil production will move higher as new wells come online at existing fields, giving state-run oil monopoly Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, time to develop shale oil and gas resources in the medium term, followed by deep-water fields in subsequent years, the company's production chief said Friday. "We now see conditions for a return to higher output," Carlos Morales, Pemex's head of exploration and production, said in an interview. "Today we are producing 2.565 million barrels a day," he said. "We hope to be reaching the end of the administration [2018] with production around three million barrels a day." Pemex's predictions for output have failed in the past, with production falling in each of the past eight years from a peak of 3.4 million barrels a day in 2004. Since 2009, the yearly declines have been minimal, and production has increased in recent months. Mr. Morales carefully outlined how Pemex would raise production at existing fields. Big offshore assets such as Ku-Maloob-Zaap and Cantarell will hold at current levels through careful management, and two new offshore fields in shallow waters will add 280,000 barrels a day in the next few years. Output at the sprawling onshore Chicontepec fields will rise to 200,000 barrels a day from the current 75,000, and mature fields being revisited with new technology will be good for an additional 190,000 barrels a day, Mr. Morales said. The Pemex production chief says he expects the company's mix of oil sources to keep the production cost of crude around the current $6.80 per barrel. But while production over the next eight years or so will be dominated by existing projects, Pemex will be moving aggressively on exploiting shale oil and gas deposits, particularly those that are part of the Eagle Ford formation in Texas that crosses the border into Mexico. "We have drilled wells in shale that produce crude," Mr. Morales said. "The cost is around $30 per barrel," which is more expensive than the relatively easy oil in the shallow waters of the Gulf of Mexico but still highly profitable at current oil prices, he added. Pemex thinks Mexico could have as much as 60 billion barrels of crude oil equivalent in shale deposits, about evenly divided between oil and gas, Mr. Morales said. In the next few years, shale resources could undergo huge development because the technology to do so is already being widely used in the U.S.

### 1nc mex growth high

#### Mexican economy stong and growing – newest data

Reuters 8-25 (Anthony Esposito and Felipe Iturrieta, Reuters, “Mexico sees economy rebounding to four percent growth in 2014,” August 25, 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/25/uk-mexico-finmin-idUKBRE97O00P20130825)

¶ ¶ (Reuters) - Mexico's economy, the second largest in Latin America, is set to rebound next year, boosted by a recovery in its main trade partner, the United States, Finance Minister Luis Videgaray said on Saturday.¶ ¶ The upbeat forecast came days after data showed Mexico's economy contracted for the first time in four years in the second quarter because of lower government spending, sluggish consumption and weak demand for exports.¶ ¶ ¶ The second-quarter contraction prompted the government on Tuesday to cut its 2013 growth outlook to 1.8 percent from a previous outlook of 3.1 percent.¶ ¶ "We expect an important recovery in the pace of (economic) growth next year of around 4 percent," Videgaray told Reuters in an interview on the sidelines of a meeting of finance ministers of the Pacific Alliance countries, made up of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.¶ ¶ Already in the second half of this year, stronger growth in the United States and increased public spending at home will help lift Mexico's economy, Videgaray said.¶ ¶ Emerging market currencies have come under heavy selling pressure recently following signals from the U.S. Federal Reserve that it may be getting ready to dial back the pace of its bond-buying monetary stimulus.¶ ¶ "The withdrawal of monetary stimulus undoubtedly introduces market volatility ... but beyond this volatility, the withdrawal of monetary stimulus in the United States is good news for Mexico," Videgaray said.¶ ¶ An economic recovery in Mexico's neighbour to the north will help "stimulate exports and stimulate remittances of Mexicans living in the United States," he said.¶ ¶ TAX REFORM, PEMEX¶ ¶ Making a case for a tax overhaul plan that lawmakers say President Enrique Pena Nieto will present on September 8, Videgaray said the country should not "simply conform itself with growing at a faster pace next year due basically to cyclical reasons."¶ ¶ Pena Nieto plans to boost tax revenue by an extra $50 billion a year with an overhaul extending sales tax coverage, closing loopholes and possibly imposing charges on capital gains.¶ ¶ "This is an integral reform that will review all taxes, the structure of all taxes, with some very clear objectives," Videgaray said.¶ ¶ Among those objectives, the overhaul will look to strengthen the government's financial backbone, simplify the tax structure to boost the competitiveness of small and medium-sized companies, and help bring more people into the formal economy.¶ ¶ The Labour Ministry estimates that the government misses out on tax revenue equal to 4 percentage points of gross domestic product because of the size of the informal economy.¶ ¶ Officials have said the government is seriously considering a proposal to raise the top income tax rate to make wealthier individuals and companies pay more.¶ ¶ Videgaray said he could not get into the specifics of the reform, but added, "This needs to be a just reform ... in other words, those who make more, pay more."¶ ¶ Earlier this month, Pena Nieto also proposed an overhaul of Mexico's energy industry to offer private companies profit-sharing contracts. The reform would mark the largest private-sector opening in decades for Mexico's energy industry, which was nationalized in 1938 and is controlled by state monopoly Pemex PEMX.UL.¶ ¶ "We expect a new fiscal regime for Pemex, a regime that treats Pemex more like a company, and that the government acts like an owner that maximizes the company's value in the long term," Videgaray said.¶ ¶ The push for changes at Pemex comes at a time of slowing oil production. Mexico produced 2.482 million barrels per day of crude oil in July, the lowest monthly output in nearly 18 years.¶ ¶ Pemex revenues fund about a third of the federal budget.¶ ¶ "This will have an effect on public finances, but the effect should be a positive effect, as this will allow Pemex to grow and contribute more to public spending," Videgaray said, adding the transition to the new regime would take a few years.

### 1nc Pemex alt cause

#### **Corruption and nationalization makes PEMEX collapse inevitable – the plan can’t overcome**

Camarena 10 (Rodrigo, is an analyst and consultant on Latin American business, politics and public policy, “Mexico's Energy Reform and the Future of Pemex” October 2010, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/6759/mexicos-energy-reform-and-the-future-of-pemex)

Mexico's Energy Reform and the Future of Pemex ¶ The ebullient celebration in Brazil over Petrobas' historic $70 billion share-issue last month was bitterly received in Mexico City, where the state-owned oil company Pemex is mired in debt, inefficiency and ongoing political wrangling. ¶ With little having changed since Mexican President Felipe Calderón sought to reform the country's energy sector two years ago, the contrast between Petrobras' successes and Pemex's failures has reignited discussion of Pemex's future and renewed the public's interest in the beleaguered Mexican oil giant.¶ Once Latin America's largest company, Pemex has persistently lost profits and market share to other state-led oil companies, including PetroChina, Russia's Lukoil, and Petrobras. Pemex's inability to expand production and compete internationally stems from decades of mismanagement, corruption and a politically sensitive constitutional provision barring the company from receiving private investment, as most of its state-led competitors already do.¶ Pemex's status as a fully state-owned enterprise has left the company vulnerable to limited financing, a dysfunctional corporate bureaucracy and corrupt public officials. Due to a lack of competitive investment and technology as well as a failure to develop new reserves, Pemex's output has declined by nearly one-third since 2004. If current trends hold, Mexico is on track to becoming a net oil importer by 2020, with some estimates projecting this taking place as early as 2016. ¶ Making matters worse, Mexico's federal government relies on taxes from Pemex's falling profits for roughly 40 percent of the total national budget, from which it funds not only Pemex itself but also the country's development and its expensive war against organized crime. ¶ In 2008, seeking to reverse the country's fortunes, Calderón's government passed one of the country's most significant energy-sector reforms since Mexico nationalized its oil industry in 1938. The reforms aimed to give Pemex greater budgetary authority, update its statist corporate structure, and allow the company to contract foreign firms to improve production and exploit untapped resources in the depths of the Gulf of Mexico -- where most of the country's hydrocarbon deposits lie.¶ To Calderón's displeasure, implementation of the 2008 law has been slow and largely unsuccessful. The law's stipulation that industry experts be added to the company's boards -- formerly made up entirely of political appointees -- has led to friction in the chain of command and to delayed decision-making. The provision allowing Pemex to contract foreign firms is currently undergoing a lengthy Supreme Court review following complaints from opposition legislators.

### 1nc mex growth alt cause

#### **Multiple structural alt causes to the Mexican economy**

Villarreal 10 (9/16/10, M. Angeles Villarreal is an Analyst in International Trade and Finance in the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service. “The Mexican Economy After the Global Financial Crisis,” Congressional Research Service http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41402.pdf)

In addition to the adverse effects from the global financial crisis and the U.S. economic contraction, Mexico’s economy is experiencing numerous other challenges. The escalation of violence since the government’s crackdown on organized crime and drug trafficking has led to investor uncertainty in some regions of the country and, subsequently, a sharp decline in foreign direct investment flows. The impact has been the most severe on the manufacturing industry, which is mostly located along the U.S.-Mexico border and has experienced significant job losses. Increasing unemployment throughout the country has led to a growing trend towards informality and self-employment. This may present a long-term problem for the government because growth in the informal sector can lead to increased poverty levels, diminished productivity, and lower prospects for sustained economic growth. Another issue is the 16% drop in remittances to Mexico in 2009, which has mostly affected the poor. Remittance inflows, which are largely from the United States, are Mexico’s second-highest source of foreign currency after oil. Numerous analysts have noted that Mexico’s potential to promote economic growth, increase productivity, and lower the poverty rate is very limited without implementing substantial structural reforms. President Calderón has proposed a number of reforms to address these challenges, including proposals to eliminate extreme poverty, overhaul public finances, privatize parts of the state oil company, adopt labor reforms, reform the telecommunications sector, and encourage political reforms. Most of these proposals, however, have deeply rooted political implications and have been strongly opposed by the major political parties in the Mexican Congress. There are some signs that the population may be pushing for change, but the prospects for passing any of the proposals will likely depend on the outcome of the 2012 presidential elections.

### 1nc econ no war

#### No impact to econ collapse – relevant empirics

Robert Jervis 11, Professor in the Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, December 2011, “Force in Our Times,” Survival, Vol. 25, No. 4, p. 403-425

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-fashioned beggar-my-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

## Russia

#### Interdependence means no Artic War

**Pate, ’10** (Chad P. Pate Major, United States Air Force B.S., Iowa State University, 1996 M.S. Troy University, 2008, December 2010, “EASING THE ARCTIC TENSION: AN ECONOMIC SOLUTION)//CC

Climate change in the Arctic is affecting the ice melt more rapidly than previously anticipated and the Arctic is now forecast to be ice-free by 2013. International borders, fossil fuel reservoirs and new sea routes for navigation are just a few of the issues at stake due to the receding ice cover. Contrary to those who perceive U.S.-Russian conflict arising out of the region and advocate a military response, this thesis argues that the Arctic, precisely because of its rich hydrocarbon resources, may prove to be amenable to a capitalist peace. Research suggests that nations linked by economic interdependence are less apt to engage in conflict with each other. Nations seeking foreign direct investment will be less likely to initiate conflict, as this would diminish the potential for attracting foreign capital. Russia’s economy is dependent on oil and natural gas exports and these industries have created enormous wealth for the nation. Yet Russia’s existing fossil fuel reservoirs are nearing exhaustion. Tapping into Arctic reserves is a strategic imperative for Russia; however, it lacks the technological capacity to do so. The energy industry in the West is farther along in developing such extractive technology. This thesis argues that Russia’s need of foreign assistance in its hydrocarbon sector will make Russia more pacific, thereby offsetting realist fears of a military conflict in the Arctic.

Doesn’t makes sense no precedent

#### No war even if expansion occurs

**Hoffman, 12** – Contributing editor to Foreign Policy and the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, which won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction (David E., “Het, Big Spender”, Foreign Policy, 10/22, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/hey\_big\_spender?page=full)//VP

Today, one-third of U.S. strategic forces, including almost all land-based missiles and some sea-based, are still ready for a prompt launch. This has not changed since the Cold War ended. The launch-ready alert time is four minutes from the moment the president gives the order for land-based missiles, and about 12 minutes for submarines. Obama's nuclear posture review acknowledged the need for more presidential decision time in a crisis, but the alert posture was left unchanged. The only reason the United States maintains a hair-trigger posture today is because Russia does. (China is not believed to keep weapons on launch-ready alert.) Despite tensions that flare up, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies; the chance of nuclear war or surprise attack is nearly zero. We trade in each other's equity markets. Russia has the largest audience of Facebook users in Europe, and is open to the world in a way the Soviet Union never was**.**

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